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FEATURE ARTICLE
The Reconstruction of Legal-
Economic Relations:
Achieving Workable Competition
by Peter C. Carstensen
Health care illustrates one of the funda-
mental themes of Neil Komesar's recent book,
Imperfect Alternatives': if one institutional strat-
egy for implementing public policy presents se-
rious problems, then it is highly likely that any
other institutional approach is also going to be
very imperfect. Basic goals for health care are
the subject of substantial public consensus. As a
nation, it is important that all citizens have ac-
cess to good health care regardless of their abil-
ity to pay. The problem lies in achieving that
goal in a manner consistent with economic effi-
ciency, cost minimization, and the retention of
ideological and social aspects of the current sys-
tem.
At present, health care policy is imple-
mented through a mix of market and political
(administrative) institutions. The resulting health
care system is economically inefficient and fails
to accomplish its fundamental goal of providing
all people with adequate health care, despite its
obvious capacity to do so. 2 The majority of health
care consumers are overcharged for the services
they personally receive.' The price includes a
subsidy for some of those receiving health care
who cannot afford to pay for such
services or whose agent (state or Professor C
federal government) refuses to andAssoci
pay. Yet such a subsidy is itself at the Univ
very inefficiently organized and the Univer
implemented in that it often taxes was a trial
those of limited means to aid States Dep
those of substantial means, his B.A. frt
Moreover, a significant amount economics
of the subsidy fund in fact never actually subsi-
dizes the care of others, but rather is diverted
into the hands of participants in health care pro-
vision.4 Thus the dysfunctions of the health care
system's methods of paying for care is demon-
strated by the amount and pervasiveness of dis-
counts that specific groups of consumers are able
to wring from providers.
In these deregulatory times, the general
thrust of public policy is to rely more on market
institutions to create the appropriate pricing and
allocation of health care services.5 Taking into
account the preference for market-based strate-
gies it would be a complete failure to expand the
role of health care markets constrained only by
general application of antitrust law. Even worse
would be the expansion of health care markets
that are unconstrained as a result of broad ex-
emptions from antitrust law in order to facilitate
agreements and combinations among such pro-
viders. Consumers cannot obtain reasonably
priced health care services for themselves, nor
distribute the cost of supporting health care for
those unable to pay in an efficient manner with-
out a more fundamental rethinking and redefini-
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tion of the highly flawed markets and adminis-
trative fiefdoms that have evolved in this indus-
try.
This thesis has two elements. First, co-
herent and productive policy analysis requires
an understanding of the recent transformation of
personal health care in historical terms. This
transformation evolves from a very marginal
activity in terms of its social value into a highly
valued, but costly, service which has retained a
system for payment and an economic organiza-
tion that maximizes the inherent difficulties in
achieving efficient and equitable economic be-
havior. Second, this historical understanding of
the dysfunctional nature of health care payments
and organization provides the basis to identify
the reforms in the basic legal conditions under
which these markets operate. Such reforms will
greatly enhance the potential that competitive
processes, as governed by active antitrust over-
sight, and will yield better results for consumers
both as recipients of health care and as the ulti-
mate payers for such services.
The transformation of medicine
The nature of health care for individu-
als6 has changed dramatically in the last few de-
cades. As recently as the 1930s and early 1940s,
doctors were largely diagnosticians who could
tell most patients what was going to happen, but
could do little to change the outcome in the vast
majority of those cases.7 Hospitals were places
people visited to be cared for while natural pro-
cesses worked themselves out and the patient
either lived or died. Due to the patient's uncer-
tainty concerning the outcome, the costs associ-
ated with individual health care were very mod-
est. Having a low expectation of success, pa-
tients had little incentive to spend more.8
Of course, there were exceptions. After
the start of the 20th century, people began to
spend more on their health care, especially as to
certain simple surgical procedures, vaccinations,
and other treatments involving limited techno-
logical and biological sophistication.9 During
that time medicine presumably offered more use-
ful and valuable responses in the cases of acci-
dental injury. Interestingly, workers compensa-
tion laws uniformly imposed the entire cost of
health care and a substantial part of the lost wages
related to industrial accidents (by far the largest
source of injury in those pre-automobile days),
on the employer regardless of the unionization
of employees or any other indicia of their bar-
gaining power. 0 This allocation of cost and re-
sponsibility for treatment of accidents is strongly
associated with the rapid decline of injury and
death in the workplace and the systematic de-
velopment of medical science to reduce the harms
associated with those injuries that did occur."
Still, for most illnesses, medicine could only dif-
ferentiate the symptoms and predict the outcome.
As such, it contributed little of social or economic
value and was compensated accordingly. 12
The transformation of health care over
the last five decades is truly profound. Starting
in the 1930s and 40s, the discovery of antibiot-
ics, the development of x-rays, and the unravel-
ing of many central biological facts about dis-
ease have lead to a genuine revolution in the role
of medicine in the lives of people. 13 Technol-
ogy, pharmacology, diagnostic techniques and
medical treatments, including transplants and
complex surgery, have made an enormous dif-
ference in the role of doctors, hospitals and medi-
cal treatment.14 With greatly increasing fre-
quency, doctors can tell patients not only what
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will happen if a condition is allowed to persist,
but also what can be done to ameliorate or cure
the condition. Indeed, today medical science
often has the capacity to sustain biological life
well past the point at which any human or hu-
mane interest is served.
The economic implications of this scien-
tific transformation are manifest. Demand for
health care has grown exponentially as it now
offers substantive improvements in the life and
well being of the patient. Such care is often costly
and as a result of its changed character the total
costs of health care have risen. 5 Whereas prior
to 1940, demand for health care was naturally
limited by its own ineffectiveness, today no such
constraint exists and increased supply at in-
creased cost will ultimately alter the health situ-
ation of many individuals. This dynamic has
changed, and is still changing, the overall eco-
nomic context of health care markets.
In terms of human experience, this trans-
formation has occurred at revolutionary speed.
Our ideas and social, as well as ethical, responses
take generations to adjust to changed scientific
realities. Thus, there are enormous problems of
how to relate many of the new capacities of medi-
cal science to the human condition. For example,
the end of life for those terminally ill is increas-
ingly a conscious choice of doctors, patient, and
family; yet, our social and ethical norms have
not clearly accepted or adapted to this dramatic
technological change.
A coherent analysis of the current prob-
lems in paying for health care has to start from
an appreciation of the technical history briefly
summarized in this thesis. Only if people can
appreciate that the very nature of the health care
being demanded today is radically different from
what it was only a few decades ago can we un-
derstand how finance and technology have got-
ten out of step with each other.
The dysfunctional character of health
care payments
How the people of the United States pay
for their health is the central economic factor in
the difficulties currently experienced by the over-
all health care system. 6 The system has the ca-
pacity and the revenue to provide adequate health
care for all citizens. 7 Nonetheless costs con-
tinue to increase and many people do not, in fact,
have access to health care.18
Which consumer pays, what they pay,
and how they pay, strongly influences the points
at which choices occur regarding the services
provided and how the resulting funds will be al-
located among those providing services. The pay-
ments system can facilitate or frustrate general
access and equal treatment for consumers. Simi-
larly, the system can encourage or discourage
self-seeking, strategic economic behavior by
participants.
For reasons of politics and social values,
the United States did not develop a system of
public, national health care as most other coun-
tries have.' 9 At the same time, there has been
and continues to be a general recognition that all
citizens should have access to competent health
care services.2' Consequently, individuals with
the financial capacity to do so paid more for their
own and their families health care directly or
through indemnity insurance (i.e., insurance that
reimbursed for specific costs) than the "actual"
CoSt.2 ' These individual transactions created a
market context in which sellers had a great deal
of opportunity to vary prices among buyers. In-
deed, in order to finance the provision of health
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care for all, it was essential that providers charge
prices to some customers substantially above cost
in order to have sufficient revenue to cover the
costs, especially fixed costs, necessary to pro-
vide services to those who were unable to pay
the full or even part of the cost. 22 Moreover, in
individual transactions, the buyer had little bar-
gaining power and even less knowledge of the
value or comparative prices of the services ren-
dered. As a small item in the budget, it was also
not worthwhile for individuals to become sophis-
ticated in valuing health care or seeking alterna-
tives.
This privately operated system to subsi-
dize the costs of the medically indigent was a
plausible solution for this country where the ide-
ology of individualism and anti-statism was
strong and the total costs of individual health care
were limited. As a historical matter, it is doubt-
ful that either state or federal government would
have had the administrative competency to op-
erate a general health care system until well into
the 20th Century, or that the value of individual
health care warranted any real concern about the
payments system. This strategy of private taxa-
tion and subsidization unreviewed and unregu-
lated does, of course, contain great potential for
inefficiency and misallocation of resources. In
addition, this approach limited the capacity of
consumers, each paying a small tax to cover the
costs of others, to consider the allocation of or
access to services being provided, or to demand
more efficient delivery of such services.
In this same period, virtually every state
adopted legislation reconstructing the payment
for medical and other expenses associated with
industrial accidents-an area of medical care in
which real progress had already been made.23
Workers compensation imposed 100% of the
costs of health care as well as a substantial part
of the resulting lost wages on the employer.24
Focusing the costs on the employer also meant
that the employer stood to gain economically if
the number of accidents declined and/or if their
costs and long term harmfulness were reduced.
Insurers and employers developed a strong in-
terest in industrial safety and industrial medicine
both of which reduced the incidence, costs and
harms of such accidents.25 Moreover, the sys-
tem of payment directly supported the achieve-
ment of these goals by defining relationships in
which the parties having control and paying the
bills also stood to gain from improvements in
employee health. The gains were reflected back
in a way that created for most employers direct
economic incentives to reduce risks and to favor
more effective medical treatment. Thus, incen-
tives were aligned and, the gains to be expected
from opportunistic behavior were reduced. 26
In contrast, with respect to general health
care, the dispersed payments system denied to
any group the capacity to be an effective con-
sumer. Hospitals sponsored insurance systems
designed largely to organize payments for their
operating expenses without regard to the poten-
tial for catastrophic risks that individuals faced. 27
These plans expanded to include routine medi-
cal care. 8 Such plans allowed the insured to
average out ordinary medical expenses and to
have them paid with pre-tax dollars to the ex-
tent that such plans were fringe benefits. 29 In
addition, especially as the capacity to treat seri-
ous diseases and injuries increased, the problems
of catastrophically large expenses and the prob-
lem of long-term expensive support lead to ad-
ditional kinds of insurance largely focused on
indemnifying patients for expenses.30 The prob-
lem of aged and medically indigent groups lead
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to separate schemes-Medicare and Medicaid.
Both systems used taxes to fund some or all of
the necessary health care.3
Because these routes to compensate
health care costs of different groups arose and
developed separately, the problems of transfer-
ring costs has been made even greater.32 Each
group or the party paying health care costs re-
ceives an advantage if they can lower their own
direct costs for health care even if the total di-
rect health care costs incurred by the system re-
main constant. Of course, such cost shifting is
likely to inflate the overall administrative costs,
but from the standpoint of any particular group
the extra administrative costs are worth incur-
ring if they result in a greater offsetting lower-
ing of direct costs. In addition, health care pro-
viders have a substantial economic stake in en-
suring that their own revenues and profits remain
high. Hence, they can and do claim that cost
transfers support the system when a primary
impact is to protect the income of particular
groups or classes of providers.33
As the costs of health care have increased,
the transfers among groups have had to increase
substantially.34 Although the public has, through
Medicare and Medicaid, undertaken greater di-
rect payment, those systems have employed gov-
ernment power to impose cost transfers to other
health care consumers as Congress became re-
luctant to pay the full cost of the care being de-
manded from the system.35 This is economically
inefficient and counter-productive, but it is po-
litically attractive since the transfers imposed to
support public access are imposed in the form of
private insurance charges or higher direct pay-
ments required of solvent customers, rather than
as direct taxes imposed on the general public.
This payment process also disperses
power in a way that makes control over costs
and service very difficult.36 No one entity is pay-
ing for the full cost, and many who pay have no
clear idea that they are paying. The necessary
consequence is that each actor takes an interest
in those costs that it can control. Government
cuts its contribution to health care costs but in-
sists that all receive care. 38 Private actors, espe-
cially when organized as group purchasers, in-
sist on special deals.39 Employers limit their con-
tribution. Because the direct costs of providing
specific services are often much below the quoted
price (i.e., the price needed to generate total rev-
enues sufficient to cover total costs), there is a
wide margin for negotiation over price and no
generally accepted method of cost accounting
provides unambiguous guidance as to reasonable
cost assignment.
In the last two decades, group plans of
various kinds have emerged as major buyers of
and providers of health care.' Once again, these
groups exist within a market system in which
buyers negotiate individual prices. The major
difference is that groups control large amounts
of purchasing power and have the capacity and
economic stake to bargain for prices as well as
services.4 Thus, once again we observe price
differences, often dramatic, between what doc-
tors, hospitals, and drug companies charge for
the same service depending on who is paying
for that service.42
Legal conditions frustrating workable
competition
Assuming market institutions are to be
the primary vehicle for reorganizing and reform-
ing health care, it is essential to give serious at-
tention to the basic legal conditions which de-
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fine how these markets can and will operate in-
cluding how these conditions interact with each
other and with the technological and economic
conditions that define the markets to create the
dysfunctions in their ultimate performance. My
suggestion is that some of the legal conditions
constituting health care that make socially use-
ful economic competition improbable are amend-
able to reform. Others, however, inhere in the
basic demand for modem health care and the
technical and social constraints within which
society provides and expects health care. Only
when the socially and legally malleable condi-
tions that define health care are reformulated to
create a context favorable to workable competi-
tion can the market process carry out the social
and economic obligations policy makers have
assigned to it. After this kind of basic reform has
occurred, it is then worth asking what role anti-
trust law should play in the reconstituted health
care market context.43 But even then, it is essen-
tial that we recognize that the results will be less
than perfect.
Two recent cases illustrate important,
dysfunctional legal conditions within which
health care markets operate. These illustrations
also demonstrate that the dysfunctional condi-
tions that define relationships in health care op-
erate on both the supply and demand side of the
process.
The first illustration is Austin v. Mercy
Health Systems,' this recent decision of the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals involving a hospital that
redefined the privileges of doctors on its staff in
ways that limited their practice.45 The hospital's
board decreed that doctors lacking a specific cre-
dential could not treat patients in its Intensive
Care Unit ("ICU"), a major profit center for the
hospital.' Not surprisingly, a staff employee of
the hospital had such a credential, thus giving
the hospital control over and billing rights for all
ICU patients because the doctors affiliated with
any competing organizations lacked anyone who
had such a credential and had privileges in this
hospital. 47 The excluded doctors successfully
contended that the hospital had violated terms
of its contract with them by reducing their rights
to treat and bill patients admitted to the hospital
(the hosptial's bylaws on privileges constituted
the contract). The court concluded that the trial
court incorrectly granted the hospital's motion
to dismiss. The court ruled that the doctor's had
come forth with sufficient evidence so that a jury
could find the hospital committed a tortious in-
terference with economic advantage which
caused the doctors to suffer a loss of position in
their community.' The court remanded the is-
sue back to the trial court for determination on
the merits.49
The doctors challenged the hospital's use
of its own, self-created, manpower plan as the
basis to determine whether or not new doctors
would be granted privileges. 0 Under this "plan"
the hospital granted privileges to its own staff
physicians but refused to accord access to doc-
tors proposed by the rival HMO." In addressing
this issue court upheld the right of the hospital
to refuse access to qualified doctors if those doc-
tors did not fit with the hospital's "plan" for the
use of its facilities.52
Under Austin, while rights of existing
doctors were protected, the court gave doctors
no rights to control future grants of privileges in
the hospital.53 Moreover, under this holding the
hospital is both a direct economic competitor of
a substantial segment of the local medical com-
munity and in this case provides the only hospi-
tal services in the community.5 4 The predictable
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consequence of defining the basic rights of the
parties in this way is that new entry and new com-
petition is made harder. This occurs because ac-
cess to the hospital, an essential element of com-
plete medical service, is made more difficult. At
the same time established doctors from the com-
peting group have a special position in the exist-
ing market. The rights created provide strong
incentives for the competing groups to agree on
terms that exclude new competition and allocate
wealth among the existing practitioners. In sum,
the basic rights defined and recognized by the
courts will make it very difficult to challenge
exclusionary decisions.
Within 11 days of the Wisconsin deci-
sion, the United States Antitrust Division com-
menced proceedings against doctors and hospi-
tals in Danbury, Connecticut and St. Joseph,
Missouri, charging them with collaborating to
create a price fixing scheme and to exclude new
entry at either level.55 The New York Times, cit-
ing unnamed experts, reported that more cases
like [these will] ... emerge as health-care pro-
fessionals struggle to defend their fees and con-
trol over medical services.56 The nature of the
rights conferred on hospitals to exclude new doc-
tors based on self-defined manpower plans will
greatly influence how successful these struggles
will be since antitrust law can only reach the most
egregious and conspicuous violations.
Similarly, in late April 1995, the United
States Supreme Court gave its blessing to large
scale, state sponsored price discrimination in
hospital services in New York State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.57 The issue in Blue Cross was
whether ERISA's pre-emption of state law relat-
ing to employee benefit plans defeated the New
York statute which imposed up to 24% price in-
creases on all health insurers and HMOs, includ-
ing those that administered health care plans for
employers.58 Only Blue Cross plans were ex-
empt, and some of the price increases went to
the hospitals while some portion went to the state.
The Court correctly held that under ERISA these
surcharges did not relate to employee benefit
plans within the meaning of the statute.59 The
goal of these charges was to tax one set of health
insurance plans for the benefit of the hospitals.'
The state and federal government were forcing
hospitals to take lower payments for patients on
Medicare and Medicaid in order to protect the
Blues from price competition because the Blues
had open enrollment for all individuals. More-
over, the state wanted to reimburse itself for some
of its health care costs.6
To justify this state interference in em-
ployee benefit plans otherwise protected by
ERISA, the Court necessarily had to take the
position that rate variations among hospital pro-
viders are accepted examples of cost variation,
since hospitals have traditionally attempted to
compensate for their financial shortfalls by ad-
justing their price.., schedules for patients with
commercial health insurers. 62 For the Court to
consider price discrimination (rate variations)
examples of cost variation63 is highly disingenu-
ous, assuming the Court truly understood the
meaning of the terms examples of cost varia-
tion. The cost of hospital care depends on the
physical condition of the patient and not on the
identity of the insurer. But to maintain the his-
toric system of subsidy, it is necessary to impose
higher prices on some users so that sufficient
revenue emerges to cover the total costs of the
operation. The Court's decision in Blue Cross
operates to validate the "traditional" system of
price differences for the same services which in
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turn tends to reinforce the discretionary power
of the price setter in any market with less than
perfect information and transferability.
The foregoing cases illustrate how the
way in which health care rights are defined struc-
ture the context within which any market activ-
ity will occur. The conditions for workable com-
petition require that informed buyers be able to
purchase essentially fungible goods or services
from multiple sellers. In such a market, price will
approximate cost, and all producers will remain
under continuous pressure to improve the qual-
ity and lower the relative price of the items sold.
This occurs because buyers realize they can make
informed choices among options and variations
in the products being sold. Moreover, if the price
differences that emerge are not clearly related to
the relative value of different alternatives, buy-
ers will switch from the more costly to the less
costly option.
Contemporary American health care mar-
kets diverge very substantially from such a
model. 64 First, the ultimate consumers, the pa-
tients, are generally not well informed, nor are
they capable of developing and processing the
necessary information, even if it were available.65
Furthermore, the patients are not likely to pay in
an easily and directly discernable way for the
choices they have made.' The costs and skills
needed to do the job would not be worth the po-
tential gains any one consumer might realize,
especially in a world in which choices are con-
strained and frequently subject to major subsidy
obligations.
Second, health care is basically a personal
service, thus health care is very hard to transfer
beyond the initial buyer through any market pro-
cess. Transferability is very helpful in ensuring
relatively equal prices among roughly similar
options because a favored buyer can resell to dis-
favored buyers. The potential for substitution
imposes a very significant limit on sellers-es-
sentially they are required to charge roughly simi-
lar prices to all buyers. Conversely, lack of trans-
ferability greatly aids sellers in varying their
prices among buyers because a buyer who gets a
low price can not resell the service. Furthermore
the inherent non-transferability of basic health
care service is made worse because the law im-
poses limits on transfer of health-related com-
modities. For example, a retail pharmacy can-
not resell prescription drugs that it obtains at a
discount to another retail pharmacy.67 This makes
price differentiation among buyers easier and less
vulnerable to break down.
Another important factor in health care
is that the majority of costs incurred at all levels
do not vary directly with the number of patients
served.68 In economic terms, there are very high
fixed costs relative to variable costs. Even those
items usually thought of as variable such as the
number of staff or hours worked are less flexible
in the case of health care. Systems exist to serve
some expected level of demand. Reducing de-
mand does not change many of the costs in-
volved. Moreover, most systems can handle in-
creases in demand without incurring substantial
expenses so long as the increase is insubstantial.
The disjuncture between general operating costs
and the out-of-pocket costs of particular patient
services creates the potential for large scale price
discrimination. Particular costs are rarely patient
specific. 69 Hence, it is rational to take a more
global view from the provider perspective and
consider whether total revenues, however de-
rived, are reasonably related to total costs.
Further complicating the pricing system
is the wide discretion necessarily given to phy-
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sicians to determine the tests and procedures that
they will employ. If each item is separately
priced, then the party deciding on the array of
things to be done to or for the patient has discre-
tion both to select from among alternatives those
which have better revenue implications, and to
employ more or less tests or procedures, or vary
the time or place, if that has income implications.
A closely related problem is that the ben-
eficiary of health care rarely pays directly for
such care.70 When any employer or the govern-
ment pays, this creates divergent interests. The
payer wants to lower costs, but the beneficiary
does not get an economic benefit tied directly to
cost savings. If all individuals and families pur-
chased health care directly, then choosing lower
cost options would translate into visible savings.
A final issue that distinguishes health care
is that quality-control concerns are very great and
no easy way to police those issues exists. It has
not proven feasible to inspect work as is done on
production lines to see if a standard of quality is
adhered to. Malpractice claims are costly and
complex and so do not reach many kinds of qual-
ity problems.7' Similarly, licensure and state
regulation has not proven very effective in iden-
tifying or removing even very poor quality per-
formance.72 The traditional solution has been to
authorize hospitals to determine which doctors
can use the facility. 73 Because access to a hospi-
tal is usually important to a physician, staff privi-
leges became a means to police quality of pro-
fessional services.
However, as hospitals increasingly be-
come parts of integrated organizations that sell
comprehensive medical services and provide
services to the community at large, this power
creates great strategic leverage to force doctors
to make choices, even unwillingly and to limit
the capacity of new service providers. In fact,
vertical integration through the hospital stage
creates serious market problems as Mercy Health
Systems illustrates.74
Reforming legal conditions to achieve
more workable competition
Achieving major changes in the legal
conditions defining health care will be very dif-
ficult politically because of the powerful vested
interests in the existing allocation of market po-
sitions including legal rights.75 As Professor
Komesar has wisely observed, the failure of one
institutional system is likely to parallel that in
others.76 The economic power of vested inter-
ests translates into political power in adminis-
trative and legislative forums. Hence, the choice
between markets and a political-administrative
strategy confronts policy makers with the iden-
tical problem of minoritarian bias which nei-
ther institution can avoid very effectively. This
is particularly pointed when it is necessary for
the political system to act to reform the legal
structure of markets so that the markets can op-
erate more effectively.77
The central reforms are in redefining
what is sold and to whom it is sold. What is sold
needs to be made as standard as possible. Health
care needs can be divided into three components.
First, the amount of routine care that individuals
need fluctuates from year-to-year and exhibits
long term trend lines showing high use early and
late in lives, but averages out over any period of
years for individuals or families.78 A second com-
ponent involves catastrophic expenses usually
involving a serious illness or accident. This risk
is relatively low; thus relatively few people ac-
tually experience such very high expenses. 79
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Here, the need is for an indemnity type of insur-
ance policy in which all potential victims pool
their risk and agree to pay off the costs of whom-
ever in the group suffers the loss. A related cata-
strophic expense arises from long term disabil-
ity requiring substantial maintenance expenses.
The risks here probably increase with age, but
remain only probable costs rather than certain
ones.80 Once again, one can look at risk pooling
and risk sharing as appropriate ways to handle
such risks. Whether one product or three are
mandated to cover these needs is not important.
What is important is that relatively fixed and
comprehensive policies to cover these needs be
defined as the way in which health care is to be
sold. This implies a single price for all custom-
ers taking a particular plan from a vendor al-
though it might be rational to vary prices based
on broad general characteristics of the popula-
tion such as age or family status which are re-
lated to expected group costs.
All individuals and families would be
required to select a comprehensive plan(s) for
their health protection, and vendors could not
refuse to sell at their established prices based on
risk or other adverse characteristics. So long as
a vendor achieved a substantial number of sales
it would have a relatively random set of the popu-
lation so that its risks based on individual char-
acteristics of high and low costs should net out."
Efficiency and effectiveness in providing for
health care itself would be central to profits.
The advantage of a defined package of
services to buyers is that buyers now need much
less information to evaluate options. By hold-
ing substantial elements constant, buyers can
focus on price and specific means by which ser-
vices will be provided, e.g., HMO, PPO, indi-
vidual selection of physician. Thus, it should be
possible to offer consumers real choice within a
framework of mandated coverage requirements
so that the election is among socially useful al-
ternatives. Meanwhile, vendors who represent
large groups of buyers have strong incentives to
examine and analyze all relevant data about costs
and values. The vendor stands to make increased
profits if it can find ways to lower the incidence
of illness or accidents among its random set of
the population or if it can find ways to reduce
the cost of treatment. In a competitive market,
the cost savings will ultimately inure to the ben-
efit of the customers because competition will
force the passing on of these savings. State or
federal government agents charged with provid-
ing health care for sub-sets of the population
would only have to have them sign up with an
appropriate plan and pay the costs.
This can not be a voluntary system be-
cause each individual is better off economically
if he or she does not share in the costs of the
system but only seeks the advantage of the ben-
efit. For this reason, a coercive system of par-
ticipation with respect to those benefits that all
desire is required. By imposing the burden on
each individual and family to buy such insurance
the gains from efficiency are reallocated to the
parties with the greatest stake in their own health
care. They get direct cost reduction as a reward
for taking less costly options. Even those being
subsidized can be given a comparable incentive
if they are allowed to retain all or even part of
the savings that result from making lower cost
selections. A simple withholding requirement
on wages and dividends with the funds flowing
to a special health care account will make this
system enforceable with respect to those who are
employed, have income from most kinds of in-
vestments or receive public or private pensions.
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Creating standard products available to
all customers still requires information to make
markets work effectively: better information is
needed about prices both of inputs (drugs, hos-
pital services, etc.) and of the competing pack-
ages. Accumulating information, however, is
difficult to accomplish without creating negative
side effects. Too much information, too soon
from market actors can facilitate price stabiliza-
tion rather than competition. Still, buyers of
health services (inputs) need to know what prices
have been. A modest lag to allow the informa-
tion to lose its immediacy will provide a useful
basis for informing future actions.
In addition, rights to inputs need to be
made as transferable as is feasible. If a hospital
or HMO gets a favorable price on a drug, it should
be free to resell that drug to other lawful users.
Similarly, if a group such as an HMO or PPO
gets favorable terms for hospital access, it should
be permitted to resell, at a profit, those rights
(sub-license them) to others seeking to place
patients in that same hospital. Such transactions
make sense economically, when seen on the
group level and focused on inputs. Similarly,
statutes mandating price discrimination in favor
of or against particular users should be elimi-
nated. If transfer payments are required, they
should be raised via taxes and paid out as direct
subsidy. This is more efficient and provides a
clearer picture of what is being spent on the pro-
vision of such services.
For such a change in the provision of
health care finance to achieve real success re-
quires that some other aspects of market organi-
zation change as well. In particular, the hospital
must be reformed. The hospital is a bottleneck
which can control a great deal of competition in
health care. Several solutions might be consid-
ered all of which involve limiting the bottleneck
power of hospitals. The right to use hospital fa-
cilities could be awarded by a third party. Hos-
pitals themselves could be redefined in a com-
mon carrier way, i.e., the hospital must lease or
provide space to any properly licensed group or
individual doctor wanting to use its facilities. A
third possibility is to convert hospital ownership
into cooperative ventures which own all hospi-
tals in a region. Health care providers in turn
would have ownership interests and could col-
lectively shape the "system". The goal is to cre-
ate a large system of hospitals with many own-
ers whose only benefit from participation is effi-
cient service. This implies that the right of par-
ticipation must be open to all existing and new
entrants into health care in the area. This also
implies that quality control concerns have to be
located elsewhere in the health care system.
Experience in grain marketing and other agri-
cultural cooperatives as well as electric power
transmission suggest that at least if there is a large
membership, such cooperative enterprises oper-
ate to eliminate the bottleneck effects.82
The marginal role of antitrust law in
restructuring legal conditions
The analysis presented here is that if
workable competition is to be the central basis
for producing efficient and effective health care
delivery, then the primary focus of attention has
to be on the conditions, amendable to legal re-
form, which currently make competition diffi-
cult. Fundamental change in legal conditions that
constitute the market must occur. Only after such
fundamental change, is it reasonably likely that
we can achieve workably competitive markets.
Antitrust law basically polices markets
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as they exist. It provides rules to deter and pun-
ish misconduct within the market and certain
major structures and changes in structure. It can
only indirectly alter the conditions under which
those markets operate. 83 Moreover, such alter-
ation of basic conditions can only be on a case-
by-case basis using antitrust. This process is very
slow and very unlikely to be effective in health
care markets. Antitrust standing alone is a nega-
tive. It forbids certain kinds of structures and
conduct. It does not and can not command
changes in current legal rights in markets.8 4 Ex-
perience gained in enforcing antitrust law is quite
relevant in guiding and informing the discussion
about how to change the basic conditions under
which health care markets operate.85 Also rel-
evant are models of industrial organization and
experience gained in the deregulatory process in
various industries. 86 Once again, the focus of
reform has to be as in other market transforming
actions on developing and implementing a strat-
egy that defines the legal conditions and rela-
tionships under which the market will operate in
ways that maximize the opportunity for compe-
tition.
Even in the absence of reform, antitrust
law does serve to make the current markets more
workably competitive and so more socially use-
ful than they would be in its absence. However,
as the two illustrative cases demonstrate, current
legal conditions governing important aspects of
contemporary health care, ensure that the posi-
tive contribution of enforced competition will be
seriously blunted.17 If the nation changes the le-
gal conditions under which health care is fi-
nanced to improve the prospects for workable
competition, then antitrust laws would be more
relevant as a means of ensuring that the basic
commands were fully and effectively enforced.
But real change requires more than active imple-
mentation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
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